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Abstract
By taking into account scale economies in transport, this paper challenges the
accepted pessimistic view that regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
between developing countries are harmful in welfare terms. In this paper, we
assume the adoption of new transport technology when trade increases and
show that, given the standard effect of a PTA on regional trade, the welfare
would be higher than that usually claimed due to the induced effect on the re-
gional transportnetwork.Moreover, there is evidence that withsuch sunk costs
in transportation, the sequence of trade liberalisation matters: the free trade
achieved under a regional PTA would lead to permanently higher welfare
than the one achieved under multilateral liberalisation. A standard model of
inter- and intra-industry trade is used and augmented by a ‘hub-and-spoke’
transport network structure, where transport costs depend on the distance
between trade partners, the volume of trade and the level of development.
Under a plausible parameterisation for scale economies in transport, regional
liberalisation will have persistent effect on trade flows through an irreversible
effect on regional transport costs that improve welfare.
JEL classification: F12, F15, R4, O1
1. Introduction
Ever since Viner’s (1950) pioneering study, the ambiguous impact on the
welfare of regional preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has been analysed
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in terms of the relative magnitude of trade creation and diversion. Since 20
years, transport costs have been recognised among the factors that could in-
fluence this trade-off. Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) first argued that regional
PTAs are more likely to be welfare enhancing when formed among what they
called ‘natural trading partners’, i.e. countries that are geographically close.
Krugman (1991a, b) developed and popularised this idea in a monopolistic-
ally competitive framework showing that continental free trade areas (i) de-
crease welfare unambiguously with zero inter-continental transport costs
and (ii) increase welfare unambiguously with prohibitive inter-continental
transport costs. Relying on simulations where transport costs take continu-
ous values between zero and prohibitive values, Frankel et al. (1996) conclude
that all else constant, a preferential trade agreement is the more likely to be
welfare enhancing (i) the more remote the continental trading partners are
from the rest of the world (i.e. the larger inter-continental transport costs
are) thereby limiting potential trade diversion and (ii) the more ‘natural’
(i.e. the closer in distance) trading partners are thereby fostering potential
trade creation (see Baier and Bergstrand (2004) for a complete survey on
simulation results).
The ‘natural trading partner’ argument potentially concerns 70% of existing
PTAs.1 It is particularly relevant for PTAs between developing countries (or re-
gional ‘South–South’ agreements), notably in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where
many PTAs are implemented between neighbouring countries that are quite
remote from major world markets. Actually, though developing countries
benefit from some recent technological advances that reduce transport costs,
extensive documentation attests to the fact that they still face considerably
higher transport costs than developed countries. Shipping costs, for instance,
are dramatically higher for developing countries according to the price
quotes from international freight forwarders (see Hummels, 2007; Limao
and Venables, 2001 or Busse, 2003). Geographical impediments (such as land-
lockedness) andpoor transport infrastructure (LimaoandVenables, 2001) con-
tribute to these high transport costs in developing countries. Moreover, as
shown by Hummels and Schaur (2013), Clark et al. (2004) and Djankov
et al. (2010), othercost-raising factors, such astime in shipping orcustom clear-
ance further increase transport costs for developing countries.2
1 On the actual 248 PTAs on goods in force in January 2013 (i.e. notified to the GATT/WTO),
170 are implemented between countries of a same region. Source: World Trade Organization
secretariat and Author’s calculation.
2 Fifteen of the 28 landlocked developing countries are in SSA, the host of many regional PTAs.
Conservative estimates put African freight costs at over twice the world average (see, for
example, the estimates in African Development Bank, 2010, figure 1.5).
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So far, the literature has characterised the environment describing devel-
oping countries by assuming ‘iceberg’ transport costs (a` la Samuelson,
1954) which supposes that only a constant fraction of the quantity shipped
actually arrives (as if ‘only a fraction of the ice exported reaches its destination
as unmelted ice’). Virtually, all simulation models so far analysing the welfare
of regional trade liberalisation have relied on this representation of transport
costs, thus ignoring the potential effect of scale economies in transport (e.g.
Frankel et al., 1996; Frankel, 1997; Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998; Baier and
Bergstrand, 2004). Simply put, transport costs are assumed unaffected by
equilibrium quantities traded. In this paper, I relax this constancy of trans-
port costs with regard to aggregate quantity of trade.
There is now strong direct evidence of the importance of scale economies
in shipping costs. Using a dataset covering the bilateral trade of six importers
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and the United States) with all
exporters worldwide in 1994, Hummels and Skiba (2004) find that doubling
trade quantities along a route reduces shipping costs by 12% for all countries
on that route. The same order of magnitude is reported by Mori and
Nishikimi (2002) and Skiba (2010). Fink et al. (2002), on studying the
liner transport price on all US imports carried by liners from 59 countries
in 1998, also find significant economies of scale with regard to traffic origin-
ating from the same port.
What are the sources of these scale economies in shipping? Sanchez et al.
(2003) and Hummels and Skiba (2004) identify three main sources of reduc-
tions in transport costs as trade quantities increase. First, a densely traded
route allows for an effective use of ‘hub-and-spoke’ shipping economies.
Second, increased quantities traded encourage the introduction of specia-
lised transport technologies along a route (as standardised containerised
shipping for maritime transport). A third source of scale benefits lies in pro-
competitive effect in pricing (limiting the monopoly mark-ups of, for in-
stance, the ‘liner conferences’) to which I return shortly.
In the model developed in this paper, I focus on the second source of scale
economies in transport: the adoption of new transport technology when
trade increases (the first source is exogenously imposed by a pre-determined
‘hub-and-spoke’ transport network built into the model). As to the endogen-
ous market structure, I take the extreme, but representative of many countries
in Africa where transport is provided by a monopolist. Hence, in the model,
according to the volume traded, a monopoly shipper decides whether to pay
sunk costs (such as investment in infrastructure) in order to adopt a lower
marginal cost transport technology.
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The justification for this approach stems from the importance of the
welfare-reducing effects of high transport costs associated with a low trade
volume, and further exacerbated by low competition intensity. For example,
the problem of ‘cargo reservation schemes’ and liner conferences, whereby
only one shipping company will cover a route because of low traffic densities,
leads to monopoly practices (see the evidence in Hummels 2007; Fink et al.,
2002). In this environment, the adoption containerisation is delayed and con-
tainerisation has yet to spread to low-income countries.
Moreover, the set-up developed in this paper takes into account a critique
that has been raised against the ‘natural trading partner hypothesis’, namely
that differences in costs determined by comparative advantage could be an
important factor weighting against the benefits of trade between close part-
ners. As noted by Panagariya (1998, p. 294), ‘distant partners can be efficient
suppliers of certain products due to othercost advantages despite the fact that
they must incur higher transport costs.’ In a comment to a model by Frankel
et al. (1996), Krugman (1998, p. 115) also notes that the restriction of iden-
tical economic size may not be innocuous and ‘surely makes a major differ-
ence when we try to model the effects of integration’. In this paper, I take the
view that differences in costs related to economic size are sufficient to address
the concerns raised by Panagariya (1998) since larger countries will have
lower production costs, while maintaining the parsimony afforded by an
otherwise symmetric modelling framework.
Based on this evidence and stylised description of the transport sector in
developing countries, the paper addresses the issue of the welfare costs of re-
gional PTAs by answering two questions. First, how is the standard welfare
analysis of regional trade liberalisation affected by the endogeneity of trans-
port costs (i.e. if trade quantities and transport costs are jointly determined)?
By boosting bilateral trade among members, regional liberalisation exploits
scale economies along regional routes (through the adoption of new trans-
port technologies) and then leads to a reduction in transport costs. This
joins the idea of Laussel and Riezman (2008) who conclude that, in the pres-
ence of fixed (but not sunk) transportation costs, some countries may require
some kind of ‘big push’, for instance, some public investments in transport
infrastructures and some coordination between governments, to get out of
the autarkic trap.
Second, the sequencing of trade liberalisation matters. Freund (2000) evi-
dences that, with sunk costs, the welfare level is higher when free trade is
reached through expanding regional trading blocs than when free trade is
accomplished by multilateral negotiations. In the same way, what are the con-
sequences of endogenous transport costs for welfare if worldwide free trade is
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achieved via PTAs rather than via multilateral trade liberalisation? Suppose
that the long-run objective is worldwide free trade. With exogenous transport
costs (i.e. transport costs independent of the level of trade), the welfare
achieved under worldwide free trade is independent of the chosen path
(i.e. via regionalism or multilateral liberalisation). Now, suppose the en-
dogenous transport technology. Sequencing then matters because of sunk
costs in transportation. Regional PTAs will then generate persistent effects
on member countries’ trade flows through the investment in sunk costs in
the regional hub and then on final welfare when they liberalise trade by re-
gional route.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 adapts a standard monopolistic
competition modelwith inter-industry trade in an agricultural good produced
under constant returns to scale and a manufacturing sector under monopol-
istic competition borrowed from Spilimbergo and Stein (1998). An explicit
‘hub-and-spoke’ transport sector with a profit maximising monopolist choos-
ing endogenously his transport technology completes this stylised representa-
tion of production and trade in a developing country. Section 3 applies the
model to a four-continent world with two types of countries: North and
South, which differ by size and economies of scale. As a start, Section 3 com-
pares the welfare evolution according to the degree of tariff preference within
symmetric regional bloc (i.e. blocs within neighbour countries of South–
South and North–North type) with exogenous/endogenous transport costs.
Section 4 then tackles the sequencing issue by contrasting welfare results
when worldwide free trade is achieved through a regional path versus a multi-
lateral non-discriminatory path. Section 5 studies how sensitive the results are
to the ‘hub-and-spoke’ transport network assumption. Results are also
extended to North–South agreements. Section 6 concludes.
2. Overview of theModel3
2.1 Basic set-up
The model includes three sectors augmented by a transport sector developed
in Section 2.2. As in Spilimbergo and Stein (1998), we assume three sectors:
agriculture, intermediate inputs and manufacturing, and two factors of
production: capital (K) and labour (L). We consider two types of
countries, which differ only in their capital endowment. In ‘poor’ countries
(subscript, p), each individual is endowed with one unit of capital, as well as
3 Appendix A.1 in Carre`re (2007) provides a complete description of the model.
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one unit of labour. In ‘rich’ countries (subscript, r), each individual owns one
unit of labour and kunits of capital (where k. 1). Imposing symmetry within
groups and a similar model structure across country groupings improves sig-
nificantly the tractability of the model while capturing, in a stylised way, the
main features necessary to include transport costs and preferential trade policy.
A representative consumer in country i share a Cobb–Douglas utility
function given by
Ui = (Cmi)a(Cai)1−a0 , a ≤ 1, i = {r; p}. (1)
With Cm(a)i the consumption of manufactures (agriculture) in country i, a
(12a) the share of consumer’s income spent on manufactures (agriculture).
In agriculture, a homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to
scale with labour as the only input and with labour productivity set to unity.
Production of the agricultural good in country i (denotedqai) is then given by
qai = Lai, i = {r; p}, (2)
Lai being the total number of workers in the agricultural sector of country i.
Therefore, under perfect competition
pai = wi, i = {r; p}. (3)
with pai the price of agriculture and wi the wage in country i.
4
A final manufactured good is produced for domestic consumption (qmi)
under a Dixit–Stiglitz technology for intermediate inputs with constant
returns to scale, each intermediate input entering symmetrically into its
production
qmi =
∑
cuji
( )1/u
, 0 , u , 1 m, j = 1, . . . , ni, i = {r; p}, (4)
cji being the consumption of the jth variety produced in country i, ni is the
number of intermediate input varieties produced in country i and u captur-
ing the extent of product differentiation across intermediates of different
origin (‘love of variety’) . As u approaches 1, the elasticity of substitution
s ¼ 1/(12u)1, and intermediates of different origin become perfect
substitutes, intra-industry trade is eliminated and only inter-industry
trade remains.
Intermediate inputs are produced with capital as input under monopolistic
competition. Increasing returns to scale is captured by assuming a fixed cost,
4 The wage in a poor country, wp, is used as nume´raire in the model.
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g, and a constant marginal cost, b
Kji = g+ bx ji ⇔ x ji = Kji − g
b
, j = 1, . . . , ni, i = {r; p}, (5)
where xji is the production of the jth variety in country i and Kji is the total
amount of capital used in the production of the jth variety in country i.
Profit maximisation combined with free entry gives output per variety
x ji = x = ug
b(1 − u) , j = 1, . . . , ni, i = {r; p}. (6)
Adding the capital constraint in each country to equation (6) implies that the
number of varieties produced in equilibrium is determined by relative
country-size here captured by relative endowments of capital
ni = Ki(1 − u)
g
, i = {r; p} and nr
np
= Kr
Kp
= k. (7)
A larger number of varieties produced in countries well endowed in capital
lead to lower unit production costs in these countries, thereby introducing
indirectly the concern of factor endowment-based models that differ in
costs matter.
2.2 Transport costs and geography
Following the literature, I consider a symmetric world divided into a number
of continents, C, equidistant from one another and comprising the same
number of countries, regions and blocs. There are 4 continents (C ¼ 4)
and 64 countries (32 rich countries spread over 2 continents and 32 poor
countries over the other two continents). Each continent is decomposed
into four regions. I assume that each PTA bloc is implemented between the
four neighbouring countries of a same region. This allows us to concentrate
on ‘North–North’ and ‘South–South’ blocs, leaving other alternatives (such
as North–South trade) to later consideration. This stylised World is relevant
for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), roughly comprising four regions: ECOWAS,
CEMAC, SADC and COMESA5, quite remote from the Northern market.
Moreover, this stylised World will imply overseas North–South agreements
in Section 5, once again relevant for SSA and the ongoing implementation of
5 Excluding countries of COMESA already take into account in SADC. ECOWAS stands for
the Economic Community of West African States, CEMAC for the Economic and
Monetary Community of Central Africa, COMESA for Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa, SADC for the Southern African Development Community.
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EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and African,
Caribbean and Pacific group of countries).6
As in the recent literature on economic geography (e.g. Frankel et al.
(1996); Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998; Fujita et al., 1999), I assume a
‘hub-and-spoke’ transport network. This is in accordance with the emer-
gence, in recent decades, of transport hubs as a privileged network structure
for many types of transport services, notably for freight and air.7 This is con-
sistent with the assumption of scale economies in the transport sector, as it is
precisely the search for lower unit transport costs that has generated the de-
velopment of ‘hub-and-spoke’ transport networks (see, e.g. Mori and
Nishikimi, 2002).
In this set-up, each country represents a ‘spoke’ and two levels of ‘hub’ are
assumed: regional and continental. For instance, in the case of SSA and the
four main regions defined above, the corresponding regional hubs in terms
of port capacity would be Durban, Abidjan, Douala and Mombasa.8
As shown in Figure 1, three freight rates (in % of the quantity traded) char-
acterise transport costs:
† fb: intra-bloc or intra-regional (from spoke to spoke via the regional
hub)—b stands for blocs;
† fc: intra-continental (from a regional hub to another via the continental
hub)—c stands for continent and
† fo: overseas or inter-continental (from a continental hub to another)—o
stands for overseas.
Trade between two countries in the same region involves two spokes and one
regional hub, which implies transport costs equal to fb. Similarly, in the case of
trade between countries in different regions of the same continent, transport
6 The counterpart is that this stylised world restricts somewhat the applicability of results to
cases, such as North America, Western and Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
7 In the case of maritime transport that largely dominates international trade, vessels size
increased drastically in relation to the development of containerisation. Container traffic
is moreover essentially concentrated in major hub ports. The 20 largest container ports
handled more than 52% of all the traffic in 2002. Examples include the European hub of
Rotterdam, as well as Asian hubs in Singapore and Hong Kong (see Review of Maritime
Transport, UNCTAD, 2003). The extraordinary development of ‘hub-and-spoke’ networks
is also observed in airlines.
8 Hub ports are large regional ports, with high volumes of direct large-vessel calls. They service
a large catchment area, which also serves the smaller regional ports by transshipping con-
tainers and general cargo in smaller vessels—see map 2.1, p. 36 in the ADB (2010) report.
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costsare equal to(fb + fc) astwo spokes, two regionalhubs and one continental
hub are implicated. Finally, across-ocean trade generates costs of (fb + fc + fo).
Hence, implicitly, transport costs depend positively on distance.
I approach the modelling of transport costs in two ways: the traditional
‘iceberg’ approach where (fb, fc, fo) represent the fraction of output lost by
the exporting country en route to its destination (as in, e.g. Frankel et al.,
1996; Frankel, 1997; Spilimbergo and Stein, 1998; Baier and Bergstrand,
2004) and one where (fb, fc, fo) represent the freight rate charged by a mon-
opolist (see below). These two alternatives are presented in Table 1. Since only
relative transport costs matter, I assume fb ¼ fc ¼ 0 for rich countries to
reflect the fact that transport costs vary according to the development level
of countries. For a given distance, North–North trade is less costly in
terms of transport costs than North–South trade, which is in turn less
costly than South–South trade. Finally, for simplicity, I assume equal trans-
port costs for intermediate inputs and agriculture products.
Letting pr(p) be the producer price in a rich (poor) country, these assump-
tions on geography and transport costs give rise to the cost, insurance and
freight (c.i.f.) prices reported in Table 1.
Table 1 presents that transport costs: (i) increase the prices of foreign inter-
mediate inputs faced by producers of manufactures and (ii) increase the dif-
ference in relative price of agriculture goods between rich and poor countries
which in turn increase the wage gap between rich and poor countries. Tariffs
are levied on c.i.f. prices.
Figure 1: Example of the ‘hub-and-spoke’ transport network: South–South Trade (two
‘poor’ continents, four regions by continent, four countries by region).
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Table 1: c.i.f. Prices Under Alternative Transport Models.
With endogenous transport costs (% of the
traded quantity)
With ‘iceberg’ transport costs (% of output lost by the
exporting country en route)
In a rich country (1) In a poor country (2) In a rich country (3) In a poor country (4)
From
c.i.f prices of imports for intermediates purchased by producers of manufactures
Bloc members pbr ¼ pr pbp ¼ pp + fb pbr ¼ pr pbp = pp/(1− fb)
Other countries on the
same continent
pcr ¼ pr pcp ¼ pp + fb + fc pcr ¼ pr pcp = pp/((1− fb)(1− fc))
Across ocean rich
countries
por ¼ pr + fo por = pr + fb/2
+ fc/2+ fo
por = pr/(1− fo) por = pr/((1− fb/2)
(1− fc/2)(1− fo))
Across ocean poor
countries
pop = pp + fb/2
+ fc/2+ fo
pop = pp + fb + fc + fo pop = pp/((1− fb/2)
(1− fc/2)(1− fo))
pop = pp/((1− fb)
(1− fc)(1− fo))
c.i.f. prices for agriculture good (imported by rich from poor countries)
Across ocean par = pap+ fb/2
+ fc/2+ fo
par = pap/((1− fb/2)
(1− fc/2)(1− fo))
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2.3 Transport sector with scale economies
As mentioned in the introduction, for maritime transport, many trade routes
are serviced by a small number of liner companies organised in formal cartels
called ‘liner conferences’ (see Hummels, 2007; Hummels et al., 2009).
Moreover, a movement towards concentration has occurred which would
not imply market power if transport routes were contestable.9 At least one
study, by Fink et al. (2002), has found evidence that freight rates are sensitive
to regulatory changes meant to constrain collusive behaviour by liner confer-
ences, suggesting the exertion of market power. More recently, Hummels
et al. (2009) show how market power leads to systematically higher shipping
prices in the developing world and find that eliminating market power in
shipping would boost trade volume by 15.2% for Latin America. More gen-
erally, for developing countries, several studies indicate that factors such as
national policies that severely restrict competition for transport services
have a major influence on the level of freight rates.10
Modelling the transport sector as a monopoly presents two advantages.
First, it captures the monopoly mark-up often observed in transport
service prices on two types of routes: maritime (corresponding to transport
between two continental hubs in our framework) and within the South con-
tinental hub.11 Second, investment in new transport technology can be easily
introduced explicitly in the model as a function of the shipper’s profit.
As proposed by Hummels and Skiba (2004), I assume that a monopoly
shipper takes decisions about how to price transport services and which
9 Only a dozen firms in the world share 80% of the container traffic (against 40%, 10 years
ago). The two leaders, accounting for more than 23% of the traffic, reinforced their domin-
ation by taking over hub ports and signing agreements (as the TransAtlantic Container
Agreement) thereby forcing loaders to deal with them (see Rodrigue et al., 2004).
10 For instance, much of SSA international transport is cartelised, reflecting the regulations of
African governments intended to promote national shipping companies and airlines (see,
for example, African Development Bank, 2010 and World Bank, 2009, who describe the
‘cargo reservation schemes’ and UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index which
takes into the account the cost-raising factors contributing to the high transport costs
for SSA estimated in Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2009).
11 Note that the monopoly assumption does not concern transport within the North contin-
ent as we have assumed fb¼fc¼0 for rich countries. Actually, we have some insights that the
market power of liner conferences is strongly attenuated on routes involving OECD coun-
tries (e.g. the United States Shipping Acts of 1984 and 1998 or the EU Regulation 4056/86
putting an end to the possibility for liner carriers to meet in conferences, fix prices and regu-
late capacities as of October 2008). Moreover, as I focus on South–South integration, the
hypothesis on the transport market involving developed countries has no impact while
allowing an appreciable simplification.
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transport technology to use, maximising the following profit function,p:
p = fbqb + fcqc + foqo − Cb − Cc − Co. (8)
With qb, qc and qo being the total traded quantities requiring, respectively,
intra-regional, intra-continental and across ocean transport services and
Cb, Cc, Co being the cost functions associated with the production of trans-
port fb, fc and fo, respectively.
Transport costs along a given route (h[b, c, o) decline with the increase in the
volume of trade alongthat routebyadoptingthe followingtechnologywithfixed
(or sunk) costs, Fh, and constant marginal costs, kh per unit shipped:
Ch = Fh + khqh, h = {b;c;o}. (9)
To produce transport services, without loss of generality, the monopolist uses
labour from the poor country where labour costs are lower. Each transport tech-
nology is characterised by the combination of parameters {Fh;kh}. The initial
technology is assumed to require no fixed costs, Fh¼ 0, but has a high marginal
cost per unit shipped. Then, as trade quantities along a route increase, the mon-
opolist can choose to improve the transport technologyused on that route, i.e. to
purchase a reduction in the marginal cost ofDkh with an incremental fixed cost
Fh, according to the following relation:
Fh = emDkh − 1, m , 0, h = {b,c,o}. (10)
In this set-up, changes in technology are discrete12, irreversible and occur only
when the profit associated with the new technology surpasses the profit asso-
ciated with the old one.13 This means that even if the monopolist would be
able to anticipate a reverse in the trade trend in near future (due, for instance,
to the end of the regional PTA), the monopoly invests today and would still
make pure profit in the case of a decrease in trade as the fixed cost has been
paid. Note that equation (10) assumes that a given reduction in marginal cost
12 As noted by Hummels and Skiba ( 2004), ‘one can think of this choice either as a single yes/
no decision on, for example, port infrastructure or [...] as a menu of ship sizes which the
shipper can select’. And as described by Skiba (2010), the containerisation of cargo, or
the use of larger capacity ships significantly lowers the unit cost of shipping but requires
an incremental investment, more likely to be done for large shipping volumes.
13 Here, we are in the ‘low’ hypothesis: all investments in key fixed costs are done by the shipper
thanks to increasing trade volume at the regional level. The ‘high’ hypothesis would be that
there exists a regional cooperation between countries to implement provisions for invest-
ment in infrastructure (e.g. Bond, 2007; Laussel and Riezman, 2008). Under this hypoth-
esis, the shipper will adopt new technologies faster (as part of the fixed costs will be not
entirely financed by its profit) which reinforces the ‘virtous circles’ when a PTA is
implemented.
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requires greater fixed costs when marginal costs are already small than when
marginal costs are high and, to ease interpretation, a given investment generates
a similar reduction in marginal costs (m constant) whatever the selected route h
(regional, continental or inter-continental).
The parameters entering the cost function in equation (10) are calibrated
using estimates in the literature as follows. Start with the most costly technol-
ogy: kh ¼ 5% and Fh ¼ 0, h ¼ b, c, o. To anticipate results of the simulations
reported in Section 3 where regional integration starts from an initial situ-
ation with a non-discriminatory (i.e. MFN) tariff on imports of t ¼ 30%,
the prices of transport services that maximise the shipper’s profit are the fol-
lowing: fb ¼ 9.6, fc ¼ 10.1, fo ¼ 6.5%, which implies transport costs in the
10–20% (of quantity traded) range for a representative poor country (see
Table 2, column 2). These are in accordance with estimates on the level of
transport costs sustained by developing countries (see Limao and
Venables, 2001; Hummels, 2007; Hummels and Schaur, 2013).
Consider now economies of scale. According to remarkably similar econo-
metric estimates for different regions of the world by Hummels and Skiba
(2004) and Mori and Nishikimi (2002), a 1% increase in trade volume
along a route reduces freight rates by 0.12% for all countries on that route.
In the same order of magnitude, Skiba (2010), using the data of five Latin
American importers from all exporters worldwide in 1994 and at the six-digit
level of the harmonised system confirms that a 10% increase in regional
volume of shipping reduces transport cost by about 1.3–2.1% in the long
run. Thus, I assume that each investment in new technology induces a gain
in marginal cost of 0.2 point of percentage, and I determine the value of m
(and of the fixed costs) that constrains the monopoly shipper to reduce
freight rates charged along a route by around 0.12% for each 1% increase
in trade volume along that route. The value of m that satisfies the preceding
constraint is 215. Hence, starting from the initial technology kh ¼ 5% and
Fh ¼ 0, the next technology corresponds to a marginal cost of 4.8% requiring
a fixed cost around Fi ¼ e(215) × (20.2%)21 ¼ 0.03 which represents around
10% of the monopoly profit in the initial situation (i.e. under MFN and with
the initial technology). Figure 2 illustrates average transport costs for the
shipper as a function of distance under this calibration.
2.4 Equilibrium
Profit, utility maximisation and free entry in the production of intermediates
lead to a vector of production and consumption in each country and to the
corresponding factor and product prices. Departing from earlier
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Table 2: Transport Costs andWelfare under Different Scenarios (k ¼ 3, a ¼ 0.5, s ¼ 4, C ¼ 4, Nr ¼ Np ¼ 16, B ¼ 4)
Iceberg
(Benchmark)
Endogenous transport costs
MFN FTA Worldwide FT
Via FTA Via MFN
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Transport costs on each route component (%)
Intra-regional fb (from spoke to spoke via
the regional hub)
10.0 9.6 8.0 7.8 7.8
Intra-continentalfc (from a regional hub to
another via the continental hub)
10.0 10.1 10.2 7.9 8.3
Inter-continental fo (from a continental
hub to another)
10.0 6.5 6.4 4.8 5.2
Total transport costs between (%)
Two poor countries-same bloc 10.0 9.6 8.0 7.8 7.8
Two poor countries-same continent 19.0 19.7 18.2 15.6 16.1
Two poor countries-different continents 27.1 26.2 24.7 20.4 21.3
One poor country and 1 rich country 18.8 16.4 15.6 12.6 13.3
Two rich countries-same continent 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Two rich countries-different continents 10.0 6.5 6.4 4.8 5.2
Increase in Wp (base ¼MFN situation) (%) – – +0.50 +2.00 +1.39
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contributions, the model also determines the profit maximising transport
technology by a monopoly shipper (whose profits are symmetrically distrib-
uted to the representative consumer across rich countries) and the corre-
sponding freight rates charges. Given the values of the ad valorem tariff
rate (t), the degree of intra-bloc preference (d), the difference in capital en-
dowment (k) and the parameters describing preferences, technology for pro-
duction and transport, together with the wage normalisation wp ¼ 1, each
equilibrium yields a value for the welfare indicator of a representative indi-
vidual in a country.14 The focus of attention in the remainder of the paper
is how individual welfare in a poor country, i.e. Wp, changes under a trade
policy organised around a trading bloc relative to a non-discriminatory
policy. The full system of equations describing the model is reported in
Carre`re (2007, appendix A.1).
3. Welfare Implication of Preferential Trade Agreements
We start with welfare implications of PTAs, and then turn to multilateral
trade liberalisation in Section 4. The set-up throughout assumes 4 continents
(C ¼ 4), 2 with only rich countries and 2 with only poor ones, with 16
Figure 2: Evolution of the average cost for the monopoly shipper.
14 Following Frankel et al. (1996) or Spilimbergo and Stein (1998) the value of the utility of the
representative individual is used as a measure of welfare. Then, the Welfare of a Southern
(Northern) country is measured by the optimised value of the utility of the representative
Southern (Northern) consumers. The optimisation problems of consumer in a poor and a
rich country are reported in Carre`re (2007, appendix A.1).
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countries per continent (Nr ¼ Np ¼ 16). Each continent has four regions.
I assume that blocs are implemented between the four neighbour countries
of a region (B ¼ 4), which then imply only blocs between countries of the
same development level. All countries are assumed to levy the same tariff
rate of 30% on imports from non-members (t ¼ 0.3) and to levy an
intra-bloc tariff of tB ¼ (12d)t on imports from member countries, where
d represents the preference margin within the bloc (0 ≤ d ≤ 1). Half of con-
sumer income is spent on agricultural goods (a ¼ 0.5) and the elasticity of
substitution among intermediate goods, s, is equal to 4 (i.e. u ¼ 0.75).15
3.1 Traditional ‘iceberg’ transport costs
Since several patterns hold under both endogenous and exogenous transport
costs, we start with ‘iceberg’ transport costs. This also helps us to relate the
results under endogenous transport costs to previous ones, which all
assumed exogenous transport costs. Figure 3 (and others) shows how
welfare for a representative poor country, i.e. Wp, varies when the preference
margin d in favour of the regional partners increases. For each set of param-
eter values, welfare is normalised to 1 under the initial MFN world (Wp0 = 1).
Note first that the inverted U-shape forWp as preferential margins increase
for all configurations and parameter values. This typical second-best result
was first noted by Meade (1955) with a slightly different model. Here, as in
the Meade model, the marginal benefits from reducing the wedge decrease
whereas the marginal costs of creating a wedge by discriminating between
trading partners increases.16
Start then with a totally symmetric world (k ¼ 1). This implies that only
intra-industry trade occurs between countries (agriculture is not traded, as
there is no comparative advantage). All countries being identical in terms
15 I have chosen parameters similar to Spilimbergo and Stein (1998) and Baier and Bergstrand
(2004) in order to have directly comparable results. A sensitivity analysis is made in Carre`re
(2007, appendix A.2).
16 More concretely, the initial reduction in intra-bloc tariffs leads to a small amount of trade
diversion following the shift away from foreign varieties that were consumed in similar pro-
portions ford ¼ 0 (and no transport cost). At the same time, trade creation effects are large
because domestic varieties (with smaller marginal utility, as they are already consumed in
large quantities) are replaced by the bloc members’ varieties. Approaching the last reduc-
tion in intra-bloc tariffs (d ¼ 1) however, consumption of member and domestic varieties
are equalised with a small marginal gain, while the marginal loss of reduction in foreign
varieties is now large: welfare effects of trade creation are then negligible while trade diver-
sion effects are large.
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of economic size, relative factor endowments, trade, tariffs and transport
costs, the specification is very close to the monopolistically competitive
framework in a perfect symmetric world proposed by Frankel et al. (1996)
and Frankel (1997).
In the absence of transport costs (fb ¼ fc ¼ fo ¼ 0), Wp reaches a
maximum value (Wpmax)for a degree of intra-bloc preference of around 7%
(which implies an intra-bloc tariff tB ¼ 28%) and Wp , Wp0 for tB ¼
26.2% (d ¼ 12.6%). Figure 3 shows that the introduction of positive
‘iceberg’ transport costs changes the relative magnitude of trade creation
and trade diversion effects and then Wpmax but does not challenge the
overall inverted-U path of welfare. With positive inter-continental transport
costs and zero intra-continental transport costs, relative inter-continental
transport costs increase, diminishing the volume of trade with remote coun-
tries (on other continents). As expected, reduced trade with remote countries
diminishes the costs of implementing sub-continental PTAs, and hence also
greater utility gains. As shown in Figure 3, with fo ¼ 0.2,Wp = Wpmaxfor d ¼
11% and for d . 20.2% we have what Frankel et al. (1996) call the ‘supernat-
ural zone’ to describe awelfare-reducing PTA (i.e.Wp , W
p
0 ) among natural
partners.
Consider now an asymmetric world (k ¼ 3) as in Spilimbergo and Stein
(1998). Not surprisingly, the welfare path of a poor country shown in
Figure 3 is very similar to the path under total symmetry as introducing inter-
industry tradewith the distant (Northernpartner) in effect destroys the positive
effects of having lower relative transport costs within the Southern trading bloc.
Figure 3: Welfare (Wp) under a PTAwith exogenous transport costs.
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Total welfare costs of discrimination are higher because countries derive utility
not only from product differentiation in consumption, but also because of
differences in costs.
Figure 3 also reports a simulation with both an asymmetric set-up and
non-zero intra-continental transport costs for poor countries. Hence, trans-
port costs are now a function not only of distance but also of the trade part-
ner’s development level, as presented in Section 2.2, Table 1. This corresponds
to our stylised representation of the world and I refer to it as the ‘benchmark’
in the following discussion. I assume fo ¼ 0.1 and for poor countries: fb ¼
fc ¼ 0.1. Table 2 column 1 reports the corresponding bilateral transport
costs derived from the formulas given in Table 1. As expected from
non-zero intra-continental transport costs,17 Figure 3 indicates that the
negative return of regionalism for a representative poor country sets in
later (Wp , W
p
0 for d ≃ 32%, i.e. tB ≃ 20%).
3.2 Endogenous transport costs
Traded quantities and transport costs are now jointly determined along the
lines described in Section 2.3: a monopoly shipper (monopolist for short)
combinedly chooses profit-maximising prices and transport technology.
The implications of this approach to endogenous transport costs are
studied in two steps: in the first step, the monopolist fixes transport service
prices with a single transport technology, then in the second step the monop-
olist combinedly chooses prices and transport technology. Figure 4 reports
the evolution of the welfare indicator as a function of the preferential
margin under both scenarios for the same regional PTA considered earlier.
3.2.1 Single transport technology
Under the high-cost single transport technology described in Section 2.3,
kh ¼ 5% and Fh ¼ 0, h ¼ b, c, o, the evolution of Wp appears to be less fa-
vourable to PTAs than the one obtained with exogenous ‘iceberg’ costs in
Section 3.1 (benchmark from Figure 3 reported in Figure 4).
Tariff reduction, through the reduction of the elasticity of transport
demand, causes the monopolist to charge a higher mark-up over marginal
costs, which lowers trade creation, a result also obtained by Hummels and
17 For a detailed discussion of the results with non-zero intra-continental transport costs see
Frankel (1997, pp. 320–21), Baier and Bergstrand (2004, pp. 42–4).
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Skiba in partial equilibrium and the shipper increases his price from 9.6%
under MFN (d ¼ 0) to 10.2% under free trade area—FTA (d ¼ 1).
3.2.2 Endogenous transport technologies
Figure 4 shows that for the selected parameterisation, Wp never enters the
welfare-reducing zone when a regional PTA is implemented. Actually, a ‘vir-
tuous circle’ is generated: the additive intra-bloc trade (due to the decrease in
intra-regional tariff ) increases the demand for intra-regional transport ser-
vices, which leads the monopolist to adopt lower marginal costs technologies
on these routes and then to offer a lower intra-regional freight rate, fb, which
in turn boosts intra-bloc trade and positively affects trade creation.18
This optimistic conclusion is partly due to the parameterisation, which does
not impose high sunk costs to obtain marginal transport cost gains. With
higher fixed costs per unit decrease in marginal costs, the ‘jump’ to the asso-
ciated higher welfare curves (the dotted lines in Figure 4, normalised to 1
under MFN regime and the first technology could be called iso-technology
welfare curves) would occur later. Then, with more costly technologies, poor
Figure 4: Welfare implication of PTAwith endogenous transport costs.
18 Note that intra and inter-continental transport services demands, qc and qo, respectively,
decrease due to trade diversion. Hence, no new technology is adopted on routes between
two regional and two continental hubs, respectively. However, as all trade flows have to
pass through a regional hub, the improvement on regional routes (and the corresponding
decrease in fb) generates positive externalities forall routes (see Table 2 column 3) that miti-
gate the negative effects of trade diversion.
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countries may sometimes, temporarily, enter the welfare-reducing zone (until
the adoption of the next technology).19
This said, the welfare curve shown in Figure 4 is in accordance with the
econometric assessments of economies of scale in transport reported previ-
ously. Between MFN (d ¼ 0) and a full regional FTA (d ¼ 1) status, import
demand increases by 133% while the price of intra-regional transport ser-
vices (fb) decreases by around 16% (see Table 2 columns 2 and 3). This esti-
mate corresponds to the estimation suggested by the econometric evidence
reported earlier, namely that ‘doubling trade quantities along a route
reduces shipping costs by a 12% on that route’.
4. The Sequencing of Trade Liberalisation
I now consider the sequencing issue (or path dependence) of trade liberalisa-
tion, recalling that under the traditional exogenous transport cost assump-
tion, reaching free trade under multilateralism or regionalism would yield
the same final value. Under the assumption that new transport technologies
are not reversed (i.e. sunk costs), columns 4 and 5 in Table 2 contrast resulting
transport costs under worldwide free trade under the two alternative paths.
Column 4 indicates the transport prices charged by the monopolist if world-
wide free trade is achieved by the following sequence: first simultaneous im-
plementation of North–North (N–N) and South–South (S–S) FTAs
followed by a removal of tariffs between blocs. Column 5 reports final
transport costs when worldwide free trade is achieved via multilateral tariff
reduction.20
Comparing the values of the welfare indicator at the bottom of the
table indicates a higher welfare when free trade is achieved under the regional
route. This is due to: (i) the adoption of improved transport technologies on
intra-regional routes to satisfy increased regional trade resulting from pref-
erential tariff elimination as shown in Figure 4; (ii) gains made thanks to
the sequencing whereby moving to free trade starting with regional free
trade only requires developing two routes (intra-continental and inter-
continental), whereas moving to free trade multilateral requires spreading
19 Appendix A.2 in Carre`re (2007) shows that the results obtained under the set of benchmark
parameter values are robust.
20 We do not compare welfare reached under FTA and under worldwide free trade. Actually,
except in the case of N–S FTA or in the case of ‘independent’ routes and endogenous trans-
port costs (see Section 5), the welfare reached under FTA is always significantly lower than
that under worldwide FT (see Table 2). In this section, FTA is only considered as a step
towards worldwide free trade, not an end in itself.
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transport cost savings on the three routes.21 As shown at the bottom of the
table, of the 0.61 ¼ 2.0021.39, 83% ( ¼ 0.50/0.61) of the gain is due to
the reduction in transport costs associated with the development of regional
routes under regional FTAs.
Hence, with scale economies in transport costs and sunk costs, a symmet-
ric (N–N and S–S) regionalism path to free trade has a persistent effect on
trade flows through a permanent effect on regional transport costs that
improves poor country welfare compared with the alternative multilateral
path, i.e. (WFTNN,SS . WFTMFN). As part of the sensitivity analysis, next section
explores an alternative path with the implementation of North–South
(N–S) FTAs.
5. Extensions
5.1 Independent transport routes
As an alternative to the ‘hub-and-spoke’ transport network structure, I now
assume that each country operates under three independent routes (also
called ‘point-to-point’ network) , each corresponding to one of the three
kinds of trade partners: regional, continental outside the regional PTA and
across ocean. It turns out that the patterns discussed here are robust to this
alternative modelling of transports as far as only the regional routes are con-
cerned. There is no significant difference between the two transport struc-
tures during the implementation of an FTA.22 Concerning the multilateral
liberalisation stage, this conclusion is strongly reinforced: with an ‘independ-
ent routes’ network, Wp under FTA (but no worldwide liberalisation) is su-
perior to Wp under worldwide free trade reached from an MFN situation!
This is because with a multilateral liberalisation from an MFN situation
(with t ¼ 30%), trade is spread too thinly among all partners so that the
improved shipping technology is never adopted. As in Skiba (2010), PTAs
are superior to MFN liberalisation with a ‘point-to-point’ network.
5.2 North–south regional blocs
The distinguishing feature of the current wave of regionalism is that it is now
overseas N–S (rather than N–N and S–S during the first wave of regionalism
in the 1960s) as illustrated by the ongoing implementation of the EPAs
21 Recall that, as described in Section 2, transport technology is specific to each kind of route.
22 As shown in Carre`re (2007, appendix A.2, figures A.3).
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(Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and African, Caribbean
and Pacific group of countries). Figure 5 contrasts welfare under N–S region-
alism with welfare under S–S/N–N considered earlier. The evolution of Wp
during the N–S bloc implementation (i.e. bloc between two poor and two
rich countries) is close to the evolution ofWp under multilateral liberalisation
(but with still the inverted U-shape) as now the two sources of gains from trade,
product variety and costs differences can be exploited within the bloc.
In terms of reduced transport costs, symmetric blocs lead to a gain of 2% in
regional marginal transport costs, whereas N–S blocs, in promoting trade on
the three routes (regional, continental and across ocean), lead to gains that
are spread out over the three routes (gain of 1% on each marginal transport
cost, which is smaller than that under worldwide free trade).
As far as multilateral liberalisation is concerned,Wp under worldwide free
trade when reached through N–S regionalism is (i) higher than that through
MFN liberalisation due to a higher volume of trade and to the adoption of a
better technology on all three routes, but (ii) smaller than that through sym-
metric blocs due to less advanced regional transport technology. Then, for
the representative parameterisation adopted here, the ranking of paths
towards free trade, the asymmetric bloc approach yields a welfare gain of
an elimination of protection in-between the alternatives examined earlier,
i.e. (WFTNN,SS . WFTNS . WFTMFN).
6. Conclusions
This paper has challenged the pessimistic view that PTAs between neighbour-
ing developing countries are likely to be welfare reducing. South–South trade
Figure 5: Symmetric vs. asymmetric trade blocs.
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agreements look more favourable once one takes into account scale economies
in transport (and the associated changes in transport technology from a profit-
maximising monopolyshipper). For plausible parameter values, when a PTA is
implemented with a Southern regional partner, a ‘virtuous circle’ is set in
motion: preferential trade increases regional trade flows which allow investing
in new transport technologies, improve the regional transport network and
reduce intra-regional transport costs, which in turn boosts intra-bloc trade,
etc. Moreover, in the long run, a regional approach to trade liberalisation
may be preferable to a multilateral approach given the presence of irreversible
effects in terms of investments in regional transport technologies. Of course,
the analysis provided in this paper is the second best exercise. An alternative
policy would be to directly subsidise transport networks and/or induce add-
itional competition on the networks. Hence, we would have the desired
effect of encouraging investment without necessarily having to introduce the
potential distortions of a preferential trade agreement.
While these results are at best suggestive, they provide support to several
recent regional PTAs and many policy recommendations. Many South–
South PTAs (e.g. MERCOSUR, Andean pact, SADC, COMESA, UEMOA)
have included ‘transport and trade facilitation’ agreements as part of their re-
gional integration initiatives, the economic partnership agreements (EPAs)
currently under negotiation between the EU and ACP involve a N–S FTA
built upon a prior South–South FTA. More directly, the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) puts emphasis on investments in region-
al infrastructure and transport networks. And a recent exhaustive review of
growth prospects for SSA identifies that poor infrastructure is the main
bottleneck to sustained growth in the region and recommends that ‘deep re-
gional integration’ (i.e. integration extending beyond the elimination of
tariffs and other policy-imposed barriers to trade) is the key to sustained
growth (World Bank, 2009). The challenge is to quantify these beneficial
channels of regional integration with greater accuracy.
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